The government of France appears paralysed. It has been through what Le Monde termed an “annus horribilis”.
President Macron is serving his second and final term, which ends in 2027. In his New Year address, he took responsibility (not without justification) for the political, if not the economic, stagnation that characterised 2024.
Macron’s gamble
In June 2024, in the wake of significant gains of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) party in the European elections, and disappointing results for his centrist colleagues, the President dissolved the parliament’s lower house (Assemblée Nationale) and called surprise elections.
After a (short-lived) collaboration during the election period between Macron’s centrists and the left alliance New Popular Front (NFP), the final result of France’s two-round system rejected RN, leaving it well short of a majority. The NFP alliance, comprising LFI (La France Insoumise – France Unbowed), the Greens, the Communists and the Socialists, emerged as the largest group in the new parliament.
The resulting Assembly is therefore fragmented, with Macron’s centrist Ensemble (or Renaissance) holding the balance of power between the extremes. Under France’s constitution, another general election cannot be held until July this year.
Bringing Barnier down
Earlier in 2024, Macron had dispensed with Prime Minister Élizabeth Borne, following concerns about anti-immigration legislation, and appointed 34-year-old former Education minister, Gabriel Attal, as PM.
After the elections, Attal stayed on as a caretaker to permit a hiatus for the Olympics. In September, Macron eventually chose Michel Barnier, on the centre-right (and former lead EU Brexit negotiator) to succeed Attal, effectively ignoring the July election result.
On this occasion, however, even Barnier’s legendary negotiating skills were not enough to persuade either the radical left or the far-right to support his budget. In a response to his attempt to force it through, an “unholy alliance” of the left NFP and the far-right RN brought him down by a no-confidence vote in the Assembly on 4 December.
France has no tradition of political compromise
It has been observed by the Economist that in other European countries where no party has an outright majority, it is commonplace for rival parties to draw up a coalition agreement. However, France has no such tradition of political compromise.
Within the President’s own centrist party, those on the left would prefer to join with the Socialist Party (PS), but not with Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who currently leads LFI. A former Trotskyist, he is unacceptable to Macron as prime minister, because, amongst other things, he has campaigned for the President’s impeachment.
Meanwhile, those on the right of Ensemble would prefer a deal with the centre-right Republicans (Les Républicains), but unless the left NFP alliance collapses, neither of these options for Ensemble would produce a majority in the Assembly.
Economic impacts for France
The challenges relating to the French economy are daunting. Barnier’s failed budget had tried to reduce the country’s deficit from over 6% of GDP in 2024 to 5% in 2025. The emergency budget, passed on 18 December, rolls over current measures, but stops short of proposals to secure fiscal reform.
Moody’s, the ratings agency, downgraded France’s sovereign debt one notch on 14 December, stating that public finances “will be substantially weakened …because political fragmentation is more likely to impede fiscal consolidation”.
Consequences of French instability for the EU
The political stalemate in France could not come at a worse time for the EU. The two most important countries in the bloc, namely France and Germany, are both facing political uncertainty, with the German federal election scheduled for 23 February, having been brought forward from September 2025 following the collapse of the German governing coalition in November.
Moreover, France’s economic woes are part of a Europe-wide phenomenon, as illustrated by the report on “European Competitiveness” for the European Commission of September 2024, by Mario Draghi, former President of the European Central Bank. This showed declining productivity, weak investment, and the need for greater market integration, both within the EU, and between the EU and the US.
The latter objective may become more elusive under the second Trump presidency.
François Bayrou, fourth PM in a year
Following Barnier’s downfall in December, Macron appointed 73-year-old centrist colleague François Bayrou as his fourth PM in a year. Bayrou initially promised to form a “national interest government” but eventually leaned towards the right, with accusations from the left that the appointments to his Cabinet were cleared with Marine Le Pen.
The French Parliament was in recess until 13 January. The following day, Prime Minister Bayrou set out his programme. As expected, this also aimed to reduce the deficit from around 6.1% at the end of 2024, to 5.4% of GDP by the end of 2025, to maintain the confidence of the EU and the financial markets.
However, the speech threw the left into disarray, with the LFI, the Greens and the Communists supporting another “no confidence” motion, and the Socialists divided.
Having held talks with the Socialists on the sensitive issue of Macron’s measure to raise the pension age, Bayrou maintained that the government would review this but would only consider changes if they would not increase the country’s debt further. He also offered further concessions, such as a rise in the national health insurance target.
In the event, on 16 January, PM Bayrou survived the no confidence vote called by the hard left, after the centre-left Socialist Party did not support the motion. “We will not censor you (today),” said Socialist Party leader Olivier Faure.
Can President Macron survive?
There are certainly those who would like to see President Macron forced to step down in 2025. Marine Le Pen, the hard-right leader of RN, who was key to the downfall of Barnier, may yet face a ban by the courts from standing for public office for five years (removing her chance to stand in the presidential elections if they are not held until 2027).
However, the numbers do not yet add up for the President and his centrist PM Bayrou to feel secure. Their best tactic may be to try to recruit both the centre-right Republicans (who are now showing some interest in government) and the centre-left Socialists, represented in both the Assembly and the Senate. The latter may now have an appetite to detach from Mélenchon’s NFP to support a ‘non-aggression pact’ which could create a working majority in the Assembly.
Such a “grand coalition” could then address the essential issues facing the country. Whether sufficient deputies on the centre left or the centre right will be moved to work with Bayrou, on a viable basis for government, remains to be seen.
President Macron’s survival until 2027 may depend on the answer.
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